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Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism: An Unprobed Link

Justin Conrad

Abstract
Existing scholarly research on terrorism has largely ignored the role of international relations and its effects on patterns of terrorism. This study argues that strategic interstate relationships can affect the amount of terrorism that a state experiences and should be considered along with “traditional” determinants of terrorism, such as domestic institutional and macroeconomic variables. The study specifically looks at state sponsorship of terrorism, arguing that while we cannot reliably identify state sponsors of terror, we can indirectly observe relevant evidence of state sponsorship. To support this claim, the study examines the annual number of transnational terrorist attacks that occurred in all countries during the period 1975–2003. The results demonstrate that states involved in ongoing rivalries with other states are the victims of more terrorist attacks than states that are not involved in such hostile interstate relationships.

Keywords
terrorism, rivalry, State-sponsored terrorism, international conflict

Following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, Indian authorities wasted no time in pointing the finger toward Pakistan. India accused Pakistan of indirectly aiding the terrorists by failing to clamp down on terrorist activity within its borders. The perpetrators of the attacks were eventually identified as members of the Pakistani terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has alleged ties to Pakistan’s

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security agencies. While India has experienced domestically motivated terrorism in the past, the state’s unusually adversarial relationship with its northern neighbor has also made the threat of state-sponsored transnational terror a reality. Although the evidence may be circumstantial, India’s accusations are not improbable. By accusing Pakistan of links to the Mumbai attacks, India has implied that the terrorist attacks are a direct result of the longstanding grievances between the two rivals.

While there are certainly other factors besides the strategic relationship between Pakistan and India that led to the attacks, the hostility between the two countries undoubtedly contributed on some level. Yet despite a sizeable and growing body of academic literature on terrorism, few studies have explicitly considered the possibility that interstate strategic relationships may affect levels of transnational terrorism. In attempting to identify the potential correlates and causes of terrorism, most of the extant research has pointed to domestic institutional variables (e.g., Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 1998, 2001; Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Abadie 2006; Piazza 2008), macroeconomic variables (e.g., Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Li and Schaub 2004; Blomberg and Hess 2008), or microfoundational variables (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Berrebi 2007). I argue that while these factors play significant roles in determining the level of terrorism within a state, we should not ignore the strategic international environment in which states operate. Even Colombia’s ongoing war with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), at first glance, seems to be a purely domestic conflict driven by domestic issues. Yet the discovery in 2008 of a FARC laptop containing information on Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and his ties to the rebel group demonstrates that interstate relationships have the power to influence patterns of terrorism.

This study examines the correlation between a state’s relationship with other countries and the amount of transnational terrorist attacks experienced by that state. I argue that when the probability of war is unusually high between two states, those states are more likely to sponsor terrorist attacks against each other as an alternative to risking full-scale war. While we cannot observe state sponsorship directly, the benefits of sponsoring terrorism are primarily related to two tactical advantages: plausible deniability and disproportionate effectiveness. State sponsorship of terrorism allows states to plausibly deny their involvement in attacks, since most support is rendered clandestinely. This is an especially important consideration for states who want to avoid war but still wish to see their adversaries harmed. And terrorist attacks can have a total effect disproportionate to the cost of support, making state sponsorship of terrorism a low-cost alternative to war. Even though we cannot reliably identify state sponsors of terror, we can indirectly observe relevant evidence by establishing that states involved in more conflictual interstate relationships experience more terrorist attacks than states that are not involved in such relationships. The analysis provides evidence of such a relationship by first establishing a correlation between interstate rivalries and state sponsorship of foreign insurgencies, arguing that states should find support of foreign insurgencies and support of foreign terrorist
groups beneficial for the same reasons. Then the study proceeds to show that rival states are more likely to be the victims of terrorist attacks than states not involved in ongoing rivalries. The hypothesis that states involved in rivalries sponsor more terrorist attacks against their rivals cannot be tested directly because, for many terrorist attacks, we lack data attributing responsibility. Even fewer data exist on state sponsorship. Instead, the analysis indirectly tests this proposition by demonstrating that rivals are the targets of more terrorist attacks than nonrivals, even after controlling for a wide range of alternative domestic and international explanations.

This study does not, however, claim to fully explain state-sponsored terrorism. Indeed, there are likely numerous additional factors that drive state-sponsored terrorism, many of which have been hypothesized but few of which have been tested empirically. I only argue here that we should consider, at a minimum, the general level of hostility between states when trying to understand variations in the amount of terrorism that states experience. This study, therefore, represents a first attempt at establishing an empirical link between conflictual interstate relationships and terrorism. The broader goal of this study is to demonstrate the role of international relations in explaining state-sponsored terrorism and terrorism in general.

The analysis is laid out as follows: in the next section, I discuss the concept of rivalry and the incentive it provides states to consider alternative foreign policy tools. I then discuss why state-sponsored terrorism, in particular, may be an attractive option for states involved in rivalries. Next, I describe the research design of the analysis, in which I employ two existing models of transnational terrorism, taking interstate rivalry into consideration. I conclude with a discussion of the results and thoughts on potential areas for future research.

**Rivalries and the Probability of Armed Conflict**

State-sponsored terrorism is a “complex and multicausal phenomenon lying between the nexus of war and peace” (O’Brien 1996, 320) which provides states with an alternative to full-scale war. The primary argument of this article is that interstate rivals, due to the heightened risk of war with their adversaries, have greater incentives to support terrorism in pursuit of their foreign policy preferences than states that are not involved in interstate rivalries. During the last half of the twentieth century, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) was the primary state sponsor of terrorism (O’Brien 1996). The Soviet Union had many tools at its disposal, but the choice to use state-sponsored terrorism was a strategic choice in the context of its relationship with the United States. Many of the strategic decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war were aimed precisely at avoiding war between the two superpowers. State sponsorship of terrorist groups, like the proxy wars and support of foreign insurgencies which marked the ongoing conflict, became an increasingly attractive alternative to direct engagement of the enemy (Laqueur 1996). The argument outlined below emphasizes that the Soviet Union may have chosen to support terrorist activities primarily out of consideration...
for its rivalry with the United States. State sponsorship of terrorism, then, should be more likely when the risk of war is especially high, as it is in rivalry situations. It is a tool to be used when all-out conflict cannot, or should not, be risked.

The concept of rivalry is somewhat of a paradox. On one hand, it can be considered an outcome of the most intense and conflictual relationships that exist in the international system. States certainly do not become rivals through normal, peaceful relations. On the other hand, states frequently identified as rivals are mutually hostile toward one another, yet their antagonism rarely reaches the point of armed conflict. If we think of conflict and cooperation between two states on a single continuum, with full cooperation at one end of the scale, and all-out war at the opposite end, then rivals may be indefinitely located closer to the all-out war side, even though their interactions may rarely move into the realm of militarized conflict. Rivalry status, therefore, indicates an unusually adversarial relationship between two states, but one that may or may not result in frequent physical combat.

In one of the early studies on the topic, Goertz and Diehl (1993) defined rivalries as “the repeated hostile interaction of the same states over a sustained period” (p. 30). While their conceptual definition only vaguely implies that armed conflict is related to rivalry, their operational definition and Bennett’s (1998) later definition of rivalry explicitly stress armed conflict as a key defining feature: two states must engage in a minimum number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over a specified period of time in order to be considered rivals. Additional scholars have concluded that states are more likely to engage in armed conflict with each other if they are involved in a rivalry (Vasquez 1996; Geller 1998). And in a follow-up study, Goertz and Diehl (1995) note that being involved in a rivalry doubles the probability of armed conflict between states. According to these conceptualizations, then, rivalries are defined by unusually high levels of militarized conflict.

But rivalries may be more accurately described as interstate relations in which only the potential for armed conflict is high. I argue that it is this potential for militarized conflict, rather than armed physical conflict itself, which drives a state’s consideration to use alternative forms of military force (including support for terrorist groups). Even Goertz and Diehl (1993) noted that “rivalries only periodically escalate to the level of militarized conflict and can persist in the absence of such conflict for a significant period of time.” So while a rivalry is undoubtedly marked by conflict at some level (diplomatic tension, threat of force, etc.), these kinds of interstate relationships are defined just as much by their lack of actual armed conflict. This is especially important to consider since some rivalries are short-lived, but most can last several generations (Goertz and Diehl 1993, 1995). In a recent update of their original work, Goertz and Diehl no longer include a time minimum or maximum when defining rivalries (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). Rivalries, then, may last indefinitely, while their related periods of actual militarized conflict may not. Maoz and Mor (1996) show that the highest likelihood of armed conflict coincides with the early years of a rivalry. Rival states experience abnormally high levels of armed engagement during the initial formation of the rivalry, and Maoz and Mor’s analysis...
suggests that they may settle into less conflictual patterns afterward. Hensel (1996) argues that rivalries may develop as a direct result of these initial engagements, since the original point of contention may not have been resolved through direct military action. In light of this information, rivals may experience armed physical combat upfront but may become more reticent over time to use direct military force against their opponent.

It is important to point out here that these characterizations of rivalries imply that even if armed conflict ends, the motivations for the initial use of force may persist. In other words, the original grievances that led to armed conflict still permeate the relationship. Indeed, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) recent reconceptualization of rivalries focuses on issue linkages between militarized conflicts: two states may engage in war fifty years apart, but if those two wars are fought over the same issue/issues, then a rivalry exists. Thompson’s alternative definition (2001) underscores the potential for long periods of peace between rivals. He considers rivals to be states that perpetually perceive each other to be enemies. Thompson expressly avoids using armed conflict as a means of categorizing rivals and notes that rivalries can involve “latent threats” rather than actual military threats. Lemke and Reed (2001) find empirical evidence that once rivalry status itself is controlled for, states actually have lower probabilities of engaging in direct combat. In other words, it may be that armed conflict is more instrumental in the initial development of a rivalry than in the sustainment of the rivalry after its formation.

All of this evidence suggests that while militarized conflict may naturally be part of rivalrous relationships, it by no means defines these relationships entirely. Rather, rivals experience just as much (if not more) time in the absence of armed conflict than they do in actual combat with their rivals. Since the risk of war is unusually high, rivals must be more selective in their use of force, yet the rivalry persists because the states’ grievances against each other still exist. Again thinking of conflict and cooperation on a single continuum, as states move away from armed conflict and war, some level of conflict continues to define the relationship and states still actively pursue their goals vis-à-vis their rivals. Diplomacy and political influence are important avenues to achieve these goals, but states frequently choose additional military options, including state support of terrorist groups. I argue in the next section that terrorism can offer states a comparatively low-risk means of pursuing their objectives within the context of a rivalry relationship.

State-Sponsored Terror as an Alternative to Armed Conflict

Why would states involved in ongoing rivalries want to use tactics such as state-sponsored terrorism? Walter Laqueur (1996) argues that “state-sponsored terrorism is quietly flourishing in these days when wars of aggression have become too expensive and too risky.” The lure of state-sponsored terrorism may be increasing for states because of the concurrently increasing costs of conventional warfare (Jenkins
1975; O’Ballance 1978; Kupperman, van Ostpal, and Williamson 1982). To emphasize that state-sponsored terrorism may be used as an alternative to war, descriptive statistics are included in the online appendix which suggest that the vast majority of terrorist attacks (95 percent) occur outside periods of military conflict or war. While Morgan and Palmer (2000) suggest that some foreign policy tools can serve as complements to traditional conflict, terrorism seems to be a substitute rather than a complement (assuming that some of the terrorism is state-sponsored). Not all states should consider terrorism a realistic foreign policy option, but the utility of state-sponsored terrorism for rivals should be particularly high since rivalries represent exceptionally contentious interstate relationships. Just as the probability of armed conflict is greatest among rivals, so too is the probability of alternative types of force. I argue that state sponsorship of terrorism should be especially attractive to states involved in rivalry situations for two tactical reasons: plausible deniability and disproportionate effectiveness, both of which offer states an opportunity to achieve their goals while avoiding the costs of war.

At the core of a state’s decision to sponsor a terrorist group is the basic desire to align oneself with groups that have similar interests. This suggests that states may pick terrorist groups in much the same way they select military alliance partners: groups with common interests, particularly those who face a common threat, are more likely to be selected for sponsorship. Sick (2003) notes that Iran moved from a policy of executing terrorist attacks in the 1980s to a policy of sponsoring non-Iranian terrorist groups that had similar interests. While common interests between the Iranian government and these groups were necessary, the movement away from direct involvement emphasizes one of the primary benefits of sponsoring terrorist groups: plausible deniability is a crucial advantage in relationships marked by a high probability of direct confrontation. As noted in the previous section, rivalries are defined not so much by the existence of actual armed conflict as by a higher probability of such conflict. Rivals always want to harm their opponents but are wary of the costs and uncertain outcomes associated with going to war, particularly given their ongoing and repeated interactions with each other. O’Brien (1996) argues that state support of terrorist groups offers a low-risk alternative for a state to continue the pursuit of hostility toward its opponent/opponents while avoiding full-scale war, especially if the support is rendered clandestinely. State support of terrorist groups, then, is particularly enticing because states can continue to undermine their rivals’ power through terrorist attacks, while also generating “uncertainty about the origin of the threat” (Kupperman et al. 1982).

While direct military support and formal political support of terrorist insurrections have been used by states to further their interests, it is comparatively lower risk forms of support which have recently become more attractive. Indirect support of terrorist activities provides an especially low-risk option for the state sponsor. These lower-risk forms of indirect assistance include providing financial support and safe havens for terrorists, and it is these forms that have been most widely used by states (Byman et al. 2001). These are particularly attractive avenues of support, not only
because they require little commitment of military or diplomatic resources but also because they are more covert forms of sponsorship which are harder to identify and even harder to prove. Even if a state suspects its rival of supporting a terrorist attack against it, proof is much less conclusive than if that same state had executed a direct military strike. Indirect support of terrorism provides states with a way to strike at their rivals in a furtive fashion while avoiding direct blame and, consequently, direct confrontation.

But why would a state consider a tactic such as terrorism, a form of low-intensity conflict, as an acceptable alternative to full-scale armed conflict? Evidence increasingly suggests that terrorist attacks can have a total effect disproportionate to the magnitude of the attack itself. Terrorist attacks can change voting patterns (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008) and can result in massive direct and indirect economic costs (Enders, Sandler, and Parise 1992; Enders and Sandler 2006) for target states. History is also replete with examples of terrorism successfully forcing changes in political arrangements (the efforts of the National Liberation Front in Algeria and the Irgun in British Palestine come to mind). Martha Crenshaw (2002) has even referred to terrorism as a “shortcut to revolution” in its ability to inspire widespread violence beyond its immediate impact. Knowing this, states can potentially achieve some of the same outcomes of conventional warfare without committing any actual troops or risking an ongoing militarized conflict, thereby avoiding large-scale costs. Through the indirect use of proxy attacks and insurgent groups, states may accomplish goals as varied as border security, the extension of regional influence, policy change, territorial change, and the destabilization or complete destruction of rival regimes (IISS Strategic Comments 1998; Byman et al. 2001; Kydd and Walter 2006). While it seems unlikely that a state would seriously consider terrorism as an option to directly topple its opponent’s government, it seems much more plausible as a means of causing instability which may indirectly trigger similarly dramatic political changes. Assistance to terrorist groups is essentially “war by other means” (Byman et al. 2001, 32).

Summarizing the logic of state-sponsored terrorism in rivalry situations: states have a desire to harm their rivals, yet these same states are especially wary of risking all-out war. Terrorism offers a solution to both problems: states can harm their rivals (perhaps to a magnitude disproportionate to the cost of sponsoring a terrorist attack) and can plausibly deny involvement. Rivals, therefore, are likely to experience more terrorism than states that are not involved in rivalries. The same logic here should apply to state support of any domestic opposition to a rival government. In the empirical analysis section following, I first analyze the correlation between rivalries and state sponsorship of insurrections. Support of these insurgency groups by foreign governments should offer the same tactical advantages as supporting terrorism, as long as the support is secretive.

To the best of my knowledge, there has been no effort in the terrorism literature to analyze the effect of rivalries on patterns of state-sponsored terrorism. Furthermore, there has been little attention paid to strategic interstate relationships at all. As noted
earlier, most existing empirical studies have focused on either domestic institutional variables, macroeconomic variables, or microfoundational variables in identifying the correlates of terrorist attacks. And while it is plausible that terrorist attacks are primarily driven by these factors, I argue that we cannot achieve a full understanding of the subject without taking into account interstate relations, as well.

Yet state sponsorship of terrorism is difficult to document, and proof often relies on circumstantial evidence and dubious witnesses. The central claim of this article is that rather than relying on direct allegations of state sponsorship, we can indirectly test the statistical relationship between hostile interstate relations (rivalries) and the number of terrorist attacks a state experiences. If state sponsorship of terrorism is more attractive to rivals compared to nonrivals, then we should observe a specific empirical relationship: states involved in rivalries should experience more terrorist attacks than states not involved in rivalries. As preliminary evidence, Table 1 presents the results from a difference in means test among two groups: rivalry dyads and nonrivalry dyads. The results are not conclusive by any means, but they suggest that rivalry dyads do indeed experience more terrorist attacks, on average, than nonrivalry dyads.10 In the next section, I describe how I will more rigorously test this hypothesis at the country level using the newest rivalry data available. I then show that existing models with transnational terrorism as a dependent variable can be improved by including interstate rivalry in the analysis.

### Table 1. Terrorist Attacks by Dyad Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyad Type</th>
<th>Mean Number of Terrorist Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonrival dyads</td>
<td>4.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry dyads</td>
<td>9.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differencea</td>
<td>–4.126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aDifference is statistically significant at .01 level.

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### Research Design

This study is as much an effort to quantitatively assess state-sponsored terrorism as it is an effort to improve the explanatory value of current models of terrorism by taking interstate relationships into consideration. Data collection of terrorist attacks poses numerous challenges in general, but state-sponsored terror is especially difficult to observe. In addition to the well-known problem of overreporting/underreporting bias in terrorism data (Drakos and Gofas 2006), identifying targets and perpetrators of attacks is frequently an ambiguous endeavor. State-sponsored terror is particularly difficult to generate data on because, as argued above, its attractiveness is directly related to its anonymity. The plausible deniability that states enjoy when supporting terrorist activities creates a similar plausible deniability in identifying those states for any data collection effort.
Unfortunately, as a result, we are unable to parse terrorist attacks into two sets: those by actors who have no international sponsorship and those by actors (domestic or foreign) who have such sponsorship. This would allow us to test the central hypothesis of this study directly, by analyzing the correlation between states that are rivals and states that sponsor individual terrorist attacks. But we cannot construct such an analysis because (1) for many terrorist attacks, we lack data on which group is responsible and (2) for those attacks where we can assign responsibility (with reasonable confidence), we have even fewer data on whether they have an international sponsor. Even knowing the nationality of the terrorists themselves does not help, since many state-sponsored terrorists are of a different nationality than their state sponsors. For example, knowing that a Lebanese Hizbollah agent pulled off an attack in Israel masks the possibility that the agent may have been sponsored by Iran. In such a case, knowing the nationality of the terrorist (Lebanese) is not useful for the purposes of this study. The models in this article, therefore, are constructed expressly to determine the probability that a state will be targeted with a terrorist attack as a consequence of its rivalry with another state. While the perpetrator of an attack may be from a different nationality than either state in a rivalry, the target of the attack should almost always be one of the two rival states.

The current analysis, therefore, is based on the premise that even though we cannot reliably identify state sponsors of terror, we can observe relevant evidence by establishing that states involved in more conflictual interstate relationships (rivalries) have experienced more terrorist attacks than states not involved in such relationships. When a state enters a rivalry, the number of actors who potentially benefit from terrorist attacks against that state increases. This analysis seeks to determine whether the explanatory power of existing and traditionally accepted models of terrorism can be improved by adding a measure of rivalry status.

Because it is unproductive to try to directly examine who are the sponsors of individual terrorist attacks, I have chosen to look at targets of terrorism. Since there are a number of alternative explanations for why a state should become a target of a terrorist attack, it is doubly important to control for these additional factors. In other words, the total number of terrorist attacks a state experiences is made up of two types: state-sponsored terrorist attacks and terrorist attacks not sponsored by states. Attacks without state sponsorship should be a function of independent variables included in previous studies, while my central hypothesis argues that the state-sponsored attacks should be a function of rivalry. I therefore execute two previous empirical studies in which the dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks a state experiences (i.e., is the target of). Doing so allows me to account for variation in terrorist attacks that are not state-sponsored. I then investigate whether also accounting for rivalry status significantly affects the number of terrorist attacks that a state is likely to experience.

The studies chosen for execution are by Li (2005) and Piazza (2008), and both include a wide range of covariates, with little to no operational overlap. For
instance, Li focuses on variables such as the level of democratic participation, executive constraints, and whether a state’s electoral system is parliamentary or majoritarian. Piazza’s list of covariates include regime type, economic freedom, and whether a state has previously failed. The full list of variables in the Li and Piazza models is available in the appendix. This extensive list of covariates provides the present analysis with a fairly comprehensive list of control variables, accounting for a number of possible alternative explanations for why a state might be targeted with a terrorist attack. In addition, Li conducts a time-series cross-sectional study, while Piazza’s analysis is purely cross-sectional. Using these two designs, we can identify whether the hypothesized patterns of state-sponsored terror can be applied both (1) across states and (2) within states, across time. The temporal domain of Li’s model is 1975–1997, while the Piazza study covers 151 countries from 1986 to 2003. Since Piazza includes six years that Li does not take into account, and Li includes eleven years that Piazza does not take into account, using the two data sets provides a temporal robustness check. These differences, for instance, will allow us to draw reasonable conclusions about whether the effect of state sponsorship is independent of major events, such as the cold war and the Iranian revolution. Li relies on the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data set, which contains information on transnational terrorist incidents (Mickolus et al. 2003). That is, terrorist attacks which are perpetrated by a terrorist of one nationality against a target of another nationality or a target that is located within another state. Piazza relies on information from the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism (2006) database, which also maintains information on transnational terrorist attacks.

The dependent variable in each model is the number of transnational terrorist attacks that a state experiences: either in a given year (Li) or total during the time period 1986–2003 (Piazza). States within the ITERATE data set experience between 0 and 180 terrorist attacks in a given year, while the number of terrorist attacks per country (1986–2003) in the U.S. State Department data ranges from 0 to 286. Given that the dependent variable of interest in each model is transnational terrorism rather than domestic terrorism, a measure of interstate relations such as rivalry should be particularly relevant to any attempt at drawing correlative or causal inferences. Li does include one variable in his model that captures interstate dynamics, a variable for international conflict, which indicates whether a state is currently involved in an international conflict. The effect of international conflict is only occasionally significant across his various model specifications, however. While international conflict may seem like an important factor to consider, one of my central arguments has been that state-sponsored terrorism is frequently used as an alternative to direct armed conflict. While terrorist attacks may occur in the context of an interstate militarized conflict, it should be more likely that they occur during less conflictual times in the course of a rivalry relationship. Once involved in a direct military confrontation with
another state, it makes sense for a state to devote its limited resources to winning that conflict, rather than in support of covert terrorist operations. The incentive for using clandestine terrorist operations should decrease in the context of full-scale war.

The primary independent variable of interest is rivalry status. Although rivalry is inherently a dyadic concept, for this study, we are interested in whether a state is currently involved in a rivalry, regardless of the identity of its rival/rivals. Rivalry status is therefore coded as a “1” if a state is involved in a rivalry in a given year, and it is coded as a “0” otherwise in the Li model. In the cross-sectional Piazza specification, I code rivalry as a “1” if a state was involved in any rivalry during the period 1986–2003. I use the most recent Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) rivalry data that cover the period 1816–2001.

As mentioned previously, the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) study refines earlier conceptualizations of rivalries. It does so in two important ways relevant to the current analysis. First, Goertz and Diehl’s (1993) earlier classification scheme identified rivalries on a 3-point ordinal scale, which included isolated armed conflicts, proto-rivalries, and enduring rivalries. The new conceptualization is based on the premise that there are only two general types of conflicts: isolated conflicts and rivalries. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006, 334) partly base their operational definition of rivalry on the number of MIDs between two states in a given period; because of this, they have chosen to disregard “short-term or transient conflict” and consider interactions of this nature to be isolated conflicts rather than rivalries. In the new conceptualization, the minimum threshold for a particular dyad to constitute a rivalry is three or more MIDs over the entire period of 1816–2001. Second, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) have revised the conceptualization to focus more on the substance of disputes than simply on the number or timing of disputes. The new data set takes a more qualitative approach by identifying rivalries based primarily on the interrelation of issues across repeated militarized conflict. Several MIDs between two states, therefore, only signal the existence of a rivalry when there are common issues at stake, which link each instance of armed conflict together. The main difference, then, between the former version of the data set and the updated version is that, while the temporal element is still a component of the operational definition, it is no longer the sole indicator of a rivalry; rivalries can now be identified through issue linkages in repeated militarized conflicts between two states (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, 337).

I use the same estimation methods as Li (2005) and Piazza (2008). Since the dependent variable in each case is an event count (the number of terrorist attacks either in a given year or total across a given timeframe), ordinary least squares (OLS) is inappropriate as it allows for negative values on the dependent variable, and terrorism data do not follow a normal distribution, an important assumption of OLS. A negative binomial model, therefore, is a more appropriate way of testing the hypothesis. This estimation method has been widely used in other statistical studies of terrorism, since one of its key benefits is the ability to account for the inherent overdispersion of most terrorism event data.
Results

Prior to testing my hypothesis while controlling for the variables in the Li and Piazza specifications, I take a preliminary look at the statistical correlation between rivalry and terrorism. In 2001, RAND published a report titled *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Moments* (Byman et al. 2001), which includes, among other information, a listing of sixty-four countries that were suspected of supporting insurgencies in foreign countries during the 1991–2000 period. Although the list does not identify support for terrorist groups, per se, many of the organizations identified by the report have engaged in what would be considered terrorist activities by most current definitions, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and various state-sponsored factions that participated in the Second Congo War. Yet even though insurgencies and terrorist organizations are not synonymous, the logic of supporting both types of movements should be similar. In particularly hostile relationships such as rivalries, states may choose to surreptitiously back their adversary’s domestic opposition, regardless of the tactics used. If there is any statistical correlation, then, between states who are suspected of supporting foreign insurgencies and states who are also involved in interstate rivalries, we might expect similar correlations between states involved in rivalries and states who support terrorism.

Taking the list of states that were suspected of supporting insurgencies during the 1991–2000 period and cross-referencing it with the list of states that were also involved in rivalries during the same period (according to the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl [2006] classification) gives us some preliminary information. Table 2 shows the results of the analysis. The number of states in each of the four categories are the observed values, and these are compared to the expected values (the values in parentheses) which are calculated based on the assumption that there is no statistically significant difference between the categories. I then used a chi-square test to determine the significance of the deviation between the distributions of the expected and observed values. As the results in Table 2 show, the observed number of states that were involved in a rivalry and were suspected of supporting an insurgency is fifty-four, while the expected value (based on chance alone) is forty-three. By contrast, the number of states that were not thought to have supported a foreign insurgency but were involved in a rivalry is fifty-one, lower than the expected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Rivalry</th>
<th>Rivalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not support insurgency</td>
<td>41 (30.1)</td>
<td>51 (61.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported insurgency</td>
<td>10 (20.9)</td>
<td>54 (43.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Top values are observed frequencies. Values in parentheses are expected frequencies. Chi-square = 14.3660, \( p < .000 \).

**Table 2.** Rivalries and Suspected Support for Insurgencies
value of sixty-two. States involved in rivalries, then, seem to be linked more often with insurgencies in foreign countries. 16

Although the results of the previous chi-square test are suggestive, they only represent a prelude to establishing a correlative link between rivalry status and state-sponsored terrorism. Focusing specifically on terrorism now, I turn to the negative binomial models used by Li (2005) and Piazza (2008), where the dependent variable in each is a count of terrorist attacks. Model 1 in Table 3 reports Li’s original results.
from one version of his baseline model. This model shows two of the key insights of Li’s analysis: democratic participation reduces the expected number of transnational terror attacks, while increasing constraints on the executive increases the expected number of attacks. Model 2 keeps the baseline model and adds a measure which indicates whether a state was involved in an interstate rivalry during a given year. The rivalry term is highly significant ($p < .001$) and positive, meaning that holding the rest of Li’s covariates constant, the expected number of terrorist attacks in a state increases if that state engages in a rivalry. Substantively, a state can expect, on average, the number of terrorist attacks it experiences to increase by almost 50 percent if it is engaged in a rivalry with another state. Given that the mean number of terrorist attacks in a single year in the data set is 2.33, this substantive contribution of rivalry is considerable. Furthermore, setting all other variables in the model equal to their mean values, a state involved in a rivalry has a .58 probability of experiencing one or more terrorist attacks (compared to a .49 probability for states not involved in a rivalry).

In addition to the substantive effect of rivalry status, I also want to determine which of the two models (model 1 or 2 in Table 3) represents the best “fit” for the data at hand. Akaike (1974) developed an estimate of “information,” which is the difference between the proposed model/models and the “true” model in the real world. The estimator, known as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), uses the sample log likelihood and the number of parameters in a particular model to determine the divergence of the proposed model from the true model. Lower values of the AIC, therefore, indicate greater congruence with the true model. As the bottom row in Table 3 shows, the AIC value for model 2 is lower than the value for model 1, suggesting that model 2 represents a closer approximation to the real-world model by which terrorist events are generated. Including a measure of rivalry status, then, offers significant additional explanatory value and it is the preferred version of the model, relative to the Li (2005) baseline model.

I follow the same procedures outlined above in determining the relative contribution of rivalry status in a replication of Piazza’s (2008) model. Table 4 compares the results of Piazza’s baseline model (model 1) and the results of the baseline model plus rivalry status (model 2). The results from model 1 emphasize Piazza’s main findings that democracy and economic freedom are generally unrelated to the number of terrorist attacks a state experiences, yet previous state failures is a strong positive predictor of attacks. Adding rivalry status to the analysis (model 2) produces similar results to those found using the Li models: rivalry status is highly significant ($p < .001$) and positive, once again indicating that a state involved in a rivalry can expect more terrorist attacks than a state not currently engaged in a rivalry. The substantive effect here is even larger, with states involved in rivalries likely to experience nearly four times as many terrorist attacks as nonrivalry states. And setting all other variables in the model equal to their mean values, a state involved in a rivalry has a .76 probability of experiencing one or more terrorist attacks (compared to a .56 probability for states not involved in a rivalry).
I use the AIC again to determine which of the two models represents a better “fit” to the data. The results in the last row of Table 4 show that model 2 is a better fit for Piazza’s data than the original baseline model (model 1). In both the Li and Piazza models, then, adding rivalry status to the analysis significantly improves the explanatory power of the models.

To determine whether the results are robust to alternative measurements of rivalry, I use the same specifications of the previous models, but I replace the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) measurement of rivalry with one developed by Thompson (2001). In many ways, Thompson’s definition of rivalry is even more germane to the present study since it is based heavily on the probability of conflict rather than the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Number of Terrorist Incidents Regressor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient Estimate</td>
<td>Incident Rate Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State involved in rivalry?</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.94)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>1.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.82)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic freedom</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human development index</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.474***</td>
<td>1.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic area</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime durability</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression capacity index</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State failures</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>1.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.962***</td>
<td>2.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.266*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>84.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>5.713</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Piazza (2008) Replication—U.S. State Department Data

Note: AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. Z scores are given in parentheses. Results are based on a negative binomial model.
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01 (one-tailed).
occurrence of conflict. In fact, to qualify as a rivalry under Thompson’s definition, the two states involved are not required to engage in armed conflict (as they are in the Klein, Goertz and Diehl, (2006) data set). Instead, two states are considered rivals if they simply perceive each other to be enemies. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl include 183 rivalries that are not included in the Thompson data set, while Thompson includes sixty-seven that Klein, Goertz, and Diehl omit. The two studies, then, provide alternative measurements of rivalry, but still identify especially hostile interstate relationships, which is of chief importance to this study. Due to space constraints, the results of these robustness checks are included in the online appendix.

Even when substituting the Thompson measurement, the results for rivalry remain strong. States involved in Thompson rivalries will, on average, experience many more terrorist attacks than states not involved in such relationships (43 percent more in the Li model and 280 percent more in the Piazza model). Again, these results are obtained even after controlling for the wide range of covariates in each model. The AIC values for each model are also lower than those of the original baseline models, demonstrating that each model is improved by adding a measurement of rivalry, no matter which rivalry data set is used.

The results of the Li and Piazza models taken together offer one additional robustness check. The Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) rivalry classification scheme identifies many of the cold war “proxy wars” as ongoing rivalries (such as U.S.–Nicaragua, U.S.S.R.–Afghanistan, etc.). Knowing this, it could be claimed that the results obtained by adding rivalry to the analysis are simply an artifact of a single rivalry—that between the United States and the Soviet Union. But while Li’s analysis includes a large bulk of the cold war (beginning in 1975), the Piazza temporal period begins in the waning years of the cold war and includes more than a decade of data after that particular superpower rivalry (1986–2003). And since the substantive effect of rivalry status on terrorism is greater during Piazza’s temporal period, we can conclude with a degree of confidence that the results are reasonably independent of any cold war effect.

Finally, despite the empirical evidence presented here, the possibility remains that rivalry or hostile interstate relationships are correlated with another variable, which is itself the real cause of increased terrorist attacks. While the use of the Piazza and Li models accounts for a number of potential alternative causes, most of them are grounded in domestic political and economic institutions. The case has been made that states are often the targets of terrorist attacks because they are simply high-profile states. Wealthy states are more often the targets of terrorist attacks than poor states (Krueger and Laitin 2008), and Pape (2005, 2008) has argued that suicide terrorism is a tactic used primarily against foreign occupiers of other states. The implication here is that some states, because they are wealthy enough, or because they are strong enough (or adventurous enough) to occupy foreign lands, are natural magnets for terrorism. If these states are also more likely to engage in rivalries, then the effects we see in the previous models may not have anything to do with rivalry. Rather, the results may be driven by states which are economically and/or militarily
powerful. To address this alternative hypothesis, Table 5 displays the results of the first model in the article, this time incorporating alternative measures of a state’s power in the international system. Major Power is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a state is considered a major power in the system. This should account for whether a state is simply “high-profile” and should attract more terrorist attacks.

Table 5. Li (2005) Replication—ITERATE Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Coefficient Estimate</th>
<th>Model 2 Coefficient Estimate</th>
<th>Model 3 Coefficient Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Terror Incidents Regressor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State involved in rivalry?</td>
<td>0.365***</td>
<td>0.326***</td>
<td>0.328***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of world GDP</td>
<td>2.53*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.497***</td>
<td>0.463***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic participation</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(2.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. constraint</td>
<td>0.072*</td>
<td>0.081**</td>
<td>0.079**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>–0.184*</td>
<td>–0.168*</td>
<td>–0.195*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime durability</td>
<td>–0.085*</td>
<td>–0.079*</td>
<td>–0.085*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.085**</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. capability</td>
<td>0.307**</td>
<td>0.304**</td>
<td>0.317**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past incident</td>
<td>0.513***</td>
<td>0.497***</td>
<td>0.499***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–cold war</td>
<td>–0.603***</td>
<td>–0.611***</td>
<td>–0.599***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>–0.218*</td>
<td>–0.190*</td>
<td>–0.195*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–0.869</td>
<td>–1.400</td>
<td>–1.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test</td>
<td>1.490</td>
<td>1.686</td>
<td>1.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2.231</td>
<td>2.232</td>
<td>2.231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; GDP = gross domestic product; ITERATE = International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events. Z scores are given in parentheses. Results are based on a negative binomial model. Coefficients on region and electoral system dummies not reported. * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Similarly, I include a measure of a state’s share of the total world gross domestic product (GDP) to capture a state’s economic power, relative to all other states. The model already controls for GDP per capita, but a state’s share of the world total should more accurately identify the prominence of a state (i.e., it is not enough to just be wealthy; perhaps states that are very wealthy relative to other states are the targets). The results of the three models demonstrate that while a state’s relative economic power does not seem to have a consistent effect, major powers are likely to experience more terrorist attacks than nonmajor powers. Even when including these variables, however, rivalry remains consistently positive and highly significant. This indicates that while there may be some support for the idea that powerful states naturally attract more terrorism, rivalrous relationships have an independent effect on the number of terrorist attacks. Additionally, the original model includes measures for whether a state is involved in a militarized conflict or war, as well as the total capabilities of the state. The effect of rivalry, therefore, is still robust even when accounting for multiple alternative hypotheses about a state’s power and behavior.

**Conclusion**

Discussing the concept of rivalry, Thompson (2001, 559) notes that “disputes about territory, influence and status, and ideology, therefore, are at the core of conflicts of interest at all levels of analysis.” There is no reason to believe that terrorism cannot also be influenced by these conflicts of interests between states. This analysis has demonstrated that hostile interstate relationships have a powerful influence on the number of terrorist attacks that a state may experience. This is an important reminder at a time when most terrorism research is focusing on the nonstate quality of terrorist groups. The results show that the expected number of terrorist attacks within a state increases severalfold when that state enters into a rivalry with another nation. This finding is robust across different model specifications (Li [2005] and Piazza [2008]) and across different measurements of the key independent variable, rivalry (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl [2006] and Thompson [2001]).

This study has also demonstrated an innovative method of uncovering evidence of a state’s incentive to sponsor terrorism. As noted previously, no reliable data exist that link terrorist attacks to state sponsors. If state sponsorship was easy to observe, states would likely have less of an incentive to use it as a foreign policy tool. It is because of plausible deniability that state sponsorship of terrorism is even considered a feasible option by some states. This study has shown that although we may not be able to accurately identify state sponsors of terror, states involved in particularly hostile interstate relationships can expect substantially more terrorist attacks than states not involved in such relationships. Logically, states involved in these hostile relationships are also likely to sponsor more terrorist attacks than states not involved in rivalries. The present study, then, is also an important first step in identifying which states are likely to sponsor terrorist attacks.
Systemic incentives for states to sponsor terrorist organizations, however, are always changing. Due to increased global awareness and vigilance against terrorism, the attractiveness of state-sponsored terrorism may be decreasing. Iran moved from a policy of direct execution of terrorist attacks to more indirect forms of support over the 1980s and 1990s, precisely because it became too costly to continue directly engaging in terrorist activity (Byman et al. 2001; Sick 2003). Furthermore, the benefits of state-sponsored terrorism are certainly not constant, even among rivals. There are times when the thought of war is so distasteful, or the probability of war is so high, that even the remote possibility of being linked to a terrorist attack should deter states against offering sponsorship. Sometimes states simply do not want to give their rivals any excuse to launch an armed attack. Future research is needed to determine under which specific conditions states may select sponsorship of terrorism as a foreign policy tool.

Appendix

Table A1. Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of world GDP</td>
<td>Country GDP as a percentage of total GDP of all countries for a given year</td>
<td>Gleditsch (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power</td>
<td>Coded 1 if the country is a major power. Coded 0 otherwise.</td>
<td>Correlates of War Project (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic participation</td>
<td>Level of democratic participation on a 100-point scale; variable is coded 0 for nondemocracies</td>
<td>Vanhanen (2000a; 2000b) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. constraint</td>
<td>7-point scale of extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives</td>
<td>Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional/majority / mixed</td>
<td>Coded 1 if the country is democratic and has proportional representation (or majoritarian or mixed) system. Coded 0 otherwise.</td>
<td>Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2000) and Golder (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variable</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality</td>
<td>Gini coefficient of income inequality on a 100-point scale</td>
<td>Deininger and Squire (1996); missing values filled following Feng and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zak (1999) and Li and Reuveny (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Real gross domestic product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity,</td>
<td>Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime durability</td>
<td>Number of years since the most recent regime change, logged</td>
<td>Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Total population, logged</td>
<td>World Bank (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. capability</td>
<td>Logged annual composite percentage index of a state’s share of the world’s</td>
<td>Li and Schaub (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total population, GDP per capita, GDP per unit of energy, military manpow-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>er, and military expenditures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past incident</td>
<td>Average annual number of terrorist incidents since 1968</td>
<td>Computed using ITERATE (Mickolus et al. 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post–cold war</td>
<td>Coded 1 for years since 1991. Coded 0 otherwise.</td>
<td>Enders and Sandler (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Coded 1 if a state is engaged in interstate military conflict or war. Coded</td>
<td>Gleditsch et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 otherwise.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region dummies</td>
<td>Coded 1 if the country is in Europe/Africa/Asia/America. Middle East is re-</td>
<td>Li (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ference category.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HDI)</td>
<td></td>
<td>years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table A1  (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographic area</td>
<td>Natural log of total geographic surface area, 1986–2003.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression capacity index</td>
<td>$\frac{([Total \text{ armed forces in 1,000s}] \times [\text{total military budget in billions US}])}{([population in millions] \times [\text{geographic surface area in millions of square kilometers}])}$</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program: Human Development Report, various years Allen (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Coded 1 for countries with a majority or plurality of Muslims</td>
<td>U.S. State Department: CIA World Factbook</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CIA = Central Intelligence Agency; GDP = gross domestic product; ITERATE = International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events.

Author’s Note
An electronic version of this article along with replication materials can be found on the author’s Web site and on the Journal of Conflict Resolution’s Web site: http://jcr.sagepub.com/. Previous versions of this study were presented at the 2010 annual meetings of the International Studies Association and the Southern Political Science Association.

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Notes

1. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) involvement was confirmed through the testimony of the sole terrorist arrested by Indian authorities (“Pakistani Involvement in the Mumbai Attacks,” *Time*, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1864539,00.html).


3. Many, but not all, insurgencies are in fact classified as terrorist groups by the definitions used in this study.

4. Thompson’s (2001) definition of rivalry is especially focused on the potential for armed conflict. He identifies rivals simply as states that perceive each other to be enemies, even if no armed conflict occurs between them. I use Thompson’s specification of rivalry as a robustness check in the empirical analysis.

5. I rely on their updated conceptualization and data to test the central hypothesis of this article.

6. Lemke and Reed’s (2001) conclusion is part of a larger argument about possible selection bias in studies of rivalry. They argue that rivalry itself may not be the cause of increased armed conflict, but rivalry is a product of the same process that makes two states likely to engage in conflict with each other.

7. A wide variety of scholars have argued that states intervene on behalf of other states and form alliances when they share common interests or face common threats (e.g., Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979; Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979).

8. The Soviet Union, as previously mentioned, and Iran until the early 1990s (Sick 2003), are two of the few examples of states directly executing or openly supporting terrorist attacks.

9. Although some scholars (e.g., Laqueur 1977; Wilkinson 1979) have argued that, as a political tool, terrorism is largely ineffective.

10. For further preliminary evidence, please see the online appendix. It includes a complete list of individual countries that experienced both periods of rivalry and nonrivalry, and the average number of terrorist attacks in each phase.

11. Iran’s use of terrorist attacks against commercial shipping vessels during the Iran–Iraq war is an example of terrorism being used during a major armed conflict (Sick 2003).

12. Again, since attributing responsibility for a terrorist attack is such an ambiguous endeavor, knowing the identity of the other rival is less important than knowing if a state is involved in any rivalry.

13. Because the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl data ends in 2001, the results using the Piazza model will be potentially biased against my hypothesis, since any rivalries formed after 2001 will be excluded from the analysis. I also use the Thompson (2001) rivalry data for robustness purposes. The data set and results of the robustness analysis are included in the online appendix.

14. The Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) definition of MIDs is, in turn, based on the Correlates of War (COW) Project Militarized Interstate Data Set, which has also been recently updated through the year 2001. MIDs are defined as instances when “the threat, display
or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed toward
the government, official representatives, official forces, property or territory of another
state” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).

15. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) point out that the former data set’s time and conflict
parameters (six or more disputes within a twenty-year period for enduring rivalries) were
too constrictive. They note instances where a rivalry had seemingly ended and then
resumed some 15+ years later.

16. I performed a similar analysis, comparing states involved in rivalries with states
listed as experiencing insurgencies in the RAND report. The results were equally
promising: the number of states involved in a rivalry that also experienced an insur-
genacy were significantly higher than the expected number of states with those same
characteristics.

17. This model corresponds to model 5 in the original article (2005). I subsequently ran the
other nine versions of his model, adding the rivalry measure and the significance and sub-
stantive effect of rivalry changes little.

18. See incident rate ratios in Table 3, model 2.

19. All predicted probabilities calculated using Stata’s SPost package (Long and Freese
2005).

20. The baseline model corresponds to model 3 in Piazza’s original article (2008). As with Li,
I ran all versions of Piazza’s model with the rivalry measure and found that the results of
interest vary little.

21. For example, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) code Nicaragua and Colombia as
being engaged in a rivalry during the years 1994–2001 (due to repeated territorial water
disputes that often involved Colombian seizures and arrests of Nicaraguan citizens).
Thompson does not consider this to be a rivalry. On the other hand, Thompson considers
these two states to have been strategic rivals during the period 1979–1992, while Klein,
Goertz, and Diehl only list an isolated incident in 1980.

22. Not reported.

23. Furthermore, Li explicitly controls for the post–cold war era (defined as all years after
1991) and rivalry status still has a positive and significant effect on the number of terrorist
attacks.

24. Incident rate ratios are not reported in the table, but incident rate ratios (IRRs) for rivalry
status are comparable to earlier models. For example, in the “complete” model (model 3,
Table 5), a state can expect the number of terrorist attacks it experiences to increase by
almost 40 percent if it engages in a rivalry with another state. Interestingly, according to
the same model, a major power state can expect nearly 60 percent more terrorist attacks
than a nonmajor power.

25. See the appendix for descriptions of these two variables.

References


